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1.  Introduction:  community  interests  in  the  area  ·Of 
supplementary pension  schemes 
1.1  In  its Action  Programme  Relating  to  the  Implementation 
of  the  Community  Charter  of  Fundamental  Social  Rights  for 
Workers2,  the  Commission  drew  attention  to  the  lack  of 
Community  provisions  protecting migrant  workers  against  the 
loss  of  supplementary  social  security  rights.  So  far,  only 
rights acquired within statutory social security schemes  are 
guaranteed  when  a  worker  exercises  hisjher  right  to  free 
movement  within  the  Community.  As  a  result,  it  is  feared 
that  important  obstacles  to  labour  mobility  may  still 
remain. 
1. 2  The  Commission  has  stressed,  especially  in  its  Action 
Programme  Relating  to  the  Implementation  of  the  Community 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Social  Rights  for  Workers,  the 
diversity of  social protection systems  in the Member  States, 
a  diversity which reflects a  history and tradition of social 
1  In the present communication  and  as  far as pension  schemes 
are  concerned,  the  words  'supplementary'  and  'occupational' 
are  being considered as  synonymous,  as  pensions  are  normally 
related  to  income  from  work  and  hence  to  a  professional 
occupation.  All  these  schemes  have  in  common  that  they 
originated  from  initiatives  of  the  private  sector  rather 
than  being  established  by  government  legislation  as  are 
statutory  social  security  schemes.  Nonetheless, 
supplementary  schemes  are  considered  as  part  of  a  national 
social  security  system  to  the  extent  that  they  provide 
benefits  which  either  replace  or  supplement  benefits 
provided  by  statutory social security schemes  (see article 2 
of  directive  86/378/EEC).  Supplementary  pension  schemes 
comprise  a  pension  or  benefit  plan  and  a  financing  method. 
The  pension  plan  refers  to  the  set  of  rules  defining  the 
amounts  of  benefits  to  be  paid  (including  indexation), 
eligibility  conditions  for  the  acquisition  of  such  benefit 
rights  and  the  financing  method  to  be  used.  Different 
financing  methods  will  be  discussed  below  (2.3).  The 
frequently  used  term  pension  fund  refers  to  pension  schemes 
using  a  particular  financing  method,  namely  pre-funding 
through a  body  which  is formally  separated  from  the  employer 
and  set  up  for  the  specific  purpose  of  financing  one  or 
several particular pension plan(s). 
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and  cultural  achievements  which  is  specific  to  each  Member 
State.  The  Commission,  as  it  has  done  in  its  document 
10Initial  Contributions  by  the  Commission  to  the 
Intergovernmental  Conference  on  Political  Union" 
(SEC(91)500),  also  draw  attention to the  fact that there  is 
no  question  of  a  general  harmonisation  of  the  existing 
systems·.- -Supplementary  socia-l  security  schemes- -usually· form 
an  important  element  of  the  overall  social  protection  of 
workers,  and it is up  to the Member  States to decide by what 
combination  of  statutory  and  supplementary  schemes  the 
objectives  of  social  protection  are  to  be  met.  Each  Mem~er 
State  must  remain  free  to  chose  amongst  the  different 
fundamental  options  which  are available for the organisation 
of  retirement  provision:  the  choice  between  collective  and 
individual  provision;  the  choice  between  public  schemes, 
schemes  based  on collective conventions  and private schemes; 
the  choice  between  pay-as-you-go  financed  and  funded 
systems.  The  Commission  does,  however,  consider  that  too 
great  a  divergence  of  social  protection  levels  can  hinder 
the  free  movement  of  workers  and  aggravate  regional 
disparities  within  the  Community.  The  Commission  has 
therefore  proposed  a  strategy  for  the  convergence  of  social 
protection  objectives  and  policies  in  order  to  reduce  the 
aforementioned  risks  without  destabilising  the  national 
systems3. 
1.3  With regard to free movement  of persons,  the  Commission 
recalled that appropriate measures  for the  implementation of 
article  49  of  the Treaty  had  been  progressively  adopted  but 
that  there  are  still  some  areas  where  further  action  might 
have  to  be  considered.  This  is  in  particular  the  case  with 
regard  to  the  absence  of  coordination  of  supplementary 
social  security  schemes  on  the  basis  of  article  51  of  the 
Treaty  (it  should  be  noted  that  the  question  of  decision 
making  on  the  basis  of  this  article  is  under  discussion  at 
the  Intergovernmental  Conference).  Thus  an  important 
obstacle  to  the  development  of  labour  mobility  from  one 
Member  state  to  another  may  still  remain.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  guaranteeing  supplementary  social  security  rights  of 
migrant workers  is very complicated,  given the diversity and 
large  number  - even  on  a  national  level  - of  supplementary 
schemes. 
1.4  For  these  reasons  the  Commission  has  opted  for  a 
careful  and  gradualist  approach,  starting  with  a 
communication  in order to stimulate a  Community-wide debate. 
Furthermore,  it  appeared  useful  to  single  out  pension 
schemes  which  are  in  many  countries  the  most  important 
3  see the Community  Charter of Fundamental  Social  Rights  for 
workers  article  10.  The  Commission's  action  programme 
relating  to  the  implementation  of  the.  Ch~1.rter  propos.es.  a 
recommendation  on the convergence  of  obJeCtlves  and pollcles 
in the area of social protection.  A draft recommendation has 
been  adopted  by  the  Commission  on  26  June  1991  (COM 
(91) 228) . Communication  on  supplementary pension  schemes 
element  of  supplementary  social  protection.  Other 
and  in  particular  supplementary  health  insurance, 
dealt with in  a  future  communication. 
3 
issues, 
will  be 
1.  5  The  present  communication  will  examine  supplementary 
pension  schemes  from  two  different  but  closely  related 
anqles.  In  the  first  part,  their  actual  and  potential 
contribution  to  the  overall  social  protection  of  workers 
will  be  discussed.  In  the  second· part,  their  implications 
for  freedom  of  movement  for  workers  will  be  analysed.  The 
main characteristics of pension  schemes  in each Member  state 
are  summarised  in the appendix. 
1. 6  The  Commission  is  currently  also  working  on  a  draft 
directive on  pension  funds.  Whilst the present  communication 
deals  with  the  subject  of  occupational  pensions  from  the 
viewpoint  of  free  movement  of  workers  (by  analyzing 
obstacles  to  labour  mobility  and  by  encouraging  cooperation 
at  the  Community  level  which  should  lead  to  a  greater 
convergence  of  national  policies  and  systems);  the  draft 
directive  deals  with  the  functioning  of  pension  funds  as 
financial  institutions in the Internal Market. 
1. 7  The  aim· of  the  present  communication  is  to  start  a 
discussion  at  Community  level,  involving  anyone  with  an 
interest  in  supplementary  pension  schemes,  on  the  role  of 
such  schemes  and  their  impact  on  the  free  movement  of 
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2.  The  .place  of.·  supplementary  pension  schemes  . in  th~  ·  · 
soeiCJ.l  protection of worker.s 
2.1  Supplementary  pension  schemes  in  the  context  of  the 
'three pillars'  of retirement income 
2.1. 1  Income  in  retirement  is  usually  considered  to  be 
based  on  three  systems  of  which  the  first  ·represents 
statutory· pension  schemesi  th~ second  occupational  pension· 
schemes  and  the  . third  individual  retirement  provision 
through  savings  and  life  assurance  contracts  as  well  as 
investment· in real asse.ts  and property.  The three systems  of 
retirement  provision  are  highly  interdependent,  to such  an 
extent that it would  actually make  sense to talk about three 
segments  of  a  single  column  rather  than  three  independent 
systems.  Whilst  the  structure  of  the  aggregate  or  the 
relative  weight  of  each  of  the  systems  varies  considerably 
from  one  Member  State. to  another,  one  can  safely  assume 
that,  across  the  Community,  individuals  in  comparable 
circumstances  have·  similar  aspirations  as  far  as  their 
relative  living  standard  (compared  to  previous  earnings) 
during retirement is concerned.  As  a  matter of fact,  the aim 
of  retirement  provision  is  usually  not·. just  to  ensure  a 
level of  income  sufficient for subsistence during retirement 
but  to  reach  a  living  standard  similar  to  the  one  achieved 
during one's career.  Differences  in individuals'  aspirations 
appear  to  be  less  marked  across  the  Community  than 
differences  in  the  design  and  structure  of  the  systems  of 
retirement  provision  which  can  be  found  in  the  Member 
States. 
2.1.2  Supplementary  pension  schemes  are  extremely  diverse 
and  in  the  present  communication  no  comprehensive  overview 
can  be  given  of  these  schemes  in  the  Community.  Their 
-contribution to overall  social  security  in  any  given  Member 
State  differs  widely,  depending  on  the  percentage  of  the 
total  population  covered  by  such  schemes,  eligibility 
conditions,  the  amount  and  structure  of  benefits  paid  to 
individuals  by  these  schemes,  the  quality  of  the  benefit 
promise  (whether it is an  enforceable right)  and  the quality 
of  inflation or  earnings  indexation  of  benefits  in  payment, 
such  indexation  being  an  important  safeguard  against 
inflation.  The  contribution  of  supplementary  schemes  to 
overall  social protection will  often reflect the  lacunae  of 
statutory  social  protection,  although  individuals  cannot 
necessarily  expect  in  all  situations  that  supplementary 
schemes  will  automatically  fill  all  the  gaps  left  by 
statutory  schemes.  In  order  to  develop  into  an  adequate 
complement  to  statutory  social  security,  supplementary 
schemes  need  a  favourable  legislative  framework,  especially 
as  far  as  tax  law  is concerned,  and  good  cooperation between 
the two  sides of  industry. 
2.1.3  Supplementary  pension  schemes  differ  with  regard  to 
their  scope  as  far  as  their membership  is concerned.  In the 
light  of  the  social  policy  objective  of  guaranteeing  an 
adequate  level of retirement  income  to all workers,  the fact Communication  on  supplementary pension  schemes  5 
that  the  coverage  of  supplementary  schemes  is  not  as 
comprehensive as  the coverage  of statutory schemes  has to be 
seen  as  a  major  drawback  of  occupational  pension  schemes. 
There  can  be  considerable  disparities  within  the  workforce 
and  sometimes  very  unequal  levels  of  social  protection 
depending  on  where  and  how  a  worker  is  employed  (part-time 
and  temporary  employment  vs.  full-time  employment  of 
indeterminate  duration,  size  of  the  company  and  sector  of 
activity).  Indeed,  many  workers  are  not  covered  at all by  a 
supplementary  scheme  although it should be kept in mind that 
not  all  workers  need  such  supplementary  cover  to  the  same 
extent,  low-paid  workers  being  usually  guaranteed  a  high 
level of  income  replacement  by the statutory schemes  of most 
Member  States. 
2. 1. 4  Membership  in  supplementary  schemes  can  range  from 
selected  groups  of  employees  or  even  individual  employees 
within one  company to all employees  of  a  country  in the case 
of  nation-wide  collective  agreements  creating  a  compulsory 
pension  scheme.  Schemes  can  be  set up  for  a  whole  sector  or 
industry  of  the  economy,  such  as  the  public  sector.  Some 
schemes  are  limited  to  particular  professions.  Another 
important  distinguishing  feature  is  the  degree  to  and  the 
level  at  which  membership  in  schemes  is  mandatory. 
Individual workers  may  have  a  legally protected right to opt 
out of  an  employer's  scheme  or at least be  able to negotiate 
membership  in  a  scheme  as part of their employment  contract. 
In  other  Member  States,  not  even  employers  may  be  free  to 
opt  out  of  a  national,  sectoral  or  professional 
supplementary pension  scheme. 
2.1.5  The  quality  of  the  social  protection  for  retired 
workers  resulting  from  supplementary  pension  schemes  varies 
considerably,  depending  on  how  the  schemes  are  designed  and 
how  their  financial  viability  is  safeguarded.  In  a  fully 
indexed  final  salary  scheme,  retired  workers  would  receive 
an  inflation- (or  earnings-)  adjusted  pension  related  to 
their  last  earnings.  Pensioners  are  assured  of  a  constant 
absolute  or  relative  (compared  to  workers)  living  standard 
during  the  entire  period  of  their  retirement.  Hence,  they 
will  only  bear  the  risk of  insolvency  of  the  scheme  or  the 
employer,  a  risk the effects of which  should  be  minimised  by 
an  efficient  and  appropriate  actuarial  supervision  in  the 
case  of  a  pre-funded  scheme,  compulsory  insolvency  insurance 
in the case of  book  reserves  or  compulsory  membership  in the 
case  of  pay-as-you-go  schemes.4  However,  such  fully  indexed 
final  salary  schemes  are  not  very  common.  The  opposite 
extreme  in  terms  of  risk  sharing  between  members  and  the 
scheme  are  defined  contribution  plans  where  contributions 
are  credited  to  an  individual's  account  and  no  benefit 
promise  is  given  beyond  what  can  be  paid  for  out  of  this 
accumulated  capital.  The  contributions  and  accrued 
investment  returns  are  simply  accumulated  on  behalf  of  an 
4  See  below  (2.3)  for  more  details  on  these  financing 
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individual  worker  and  then,  after  retirement,  paid  out  in 
the  form  of  a  lump-sum  or  of  an  annuity.  These  schemes  can 
almost be considered as  a  form of  individual saving.  Workers 
and  pensioners  bear  a  much  greater  share  of  the  risks 
involved  in  retirement  prov.1s1.on,  as  factors  such  as 
inflation,  asset  prices  and  investment  returns  will  affect 
directly·· the·  f-inancial  -position  of  a  - {present ·or ·future) 
pensioner.  Across  the  Community,  many  different  ways  of 
dealing  with  the  risks  of  retirement  provision  and 
especially  of  sharing  it  among  workers,  employers, 
pensioners  and,  possibly,  the state can be  found. 
2.1.6  Supplementary  pension  schemes  can  also  be 
distinguished  by  examining  who  established  and  who  runs 
them.  This  will  also  have  an  influence  on  the  design  and 
structure  of  supplementary  social  protection.  On  the  one 
hand are  schemes  created by  employers  and  run  exclusively by 
them;  the  other  extreme  are  schemes  set up  by  the  protected 
persons  themselves,  as  is  necessary  in  the  case  of  self-
employed workers.  Between the two  extremes,  various  forms  of 
cooperation  between  employers  and  employees  can  be  found, 
ranging  from  joint  management,  usually  based  on  collective 
agreements,  of  schemes  by  the  two  sides  of  industry  to 
various  forms  of  employee participation. 
2.2  Public  policy  and  collective  retirement  provision 
through statutory and  occupational  pension  schemes 
2.2.1  In  both  the  first  and  the  second  pillars, 
retirement  provision  is  largely  collective  and  the  freedom 
of  individual workers  not to become  a  member  of  some  pension 
scheme  is very  limited,  even if the employer may  be  free  not 
to  establish  a  scheme  or  not  to  offer  membership  in  it to 
some  of  the  employees.  Retirement  provision  is  largely 
compulsory  for  individual  workers  whose  personal  initiative 
is  usually  limited  to  the  third  pillar,  i.e.  additional 
personal  savings,  life  assurance  contracts  and  the 
acquisition  of  real  property.5  The  fact  that  retirement 
provision  in the first  two  pillars  - which  represent  by  far 
the  most  important  sources  of  income  during  retirement  - is 
largely  compulsory  for  workers  can  be  explained  by  the 
observed  tendency  of  individuals  not  to  make  sufficient 
provision  by  themselves.  Especially younger  workers  may  not 
realise  how  much  effort  is  necessary  during  the  whole 
5  Workers  may,  however,  have  the  possibility  to  exercise 
individual  choice  by  deciding  into  which  scheme  a  given 
amount  of contributions is to be paid.  This  can  be  linked to 
the  right,  for  the  worker,  to  opt  out  of  their  employers' 
schemes  or  even  the  statutory  scheme  so  that  contributions 
are  available  for  another  1 personal'  pension  scheme  which 
are  offered  by  insurance  companies  and  other  financial 
institutions.  Workers  may  also  be  free  to  make  additional 
voluntary  contributions  into  first  and  second  pillar 
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working  life· in  order  to  secure  a  reasonable  income  during 
retirement.  Furthermore,  collective  forms  of  retirement 
provision  diminish  the  individual  risks  which  are  always 
involved  in  long  term  savings decisions. 
2.2.2  By  making  retirement  provision  compulsory  for 
individuals  and  by  pooling  risks,  first- and  second~pillar 
pension  schemes  reduce  the  risk  of  poverty  during  old  age 
and  the  likelihood  of  an  individual  having  to  claim  social 
assistance after retiring  from  work.  In most .Member  States, 
collective  pension  schemes  have  significantly  reduced  the 
incidence  of  poverty  amongst  the  elderly.  Public  policy  is 
largely responsible for this success,  be it directly through 
the  running  of  a  statutory  pension  scheme  or  indirectly 
through  various  measures  designed  to  encourage  private 
initiative in the area of retirement provision. 
2.2.3  Public  policy  influences  the  second:  pillar  of 
retirement  provision  through  various  channels.  By 
determining  the  type  and  extent  of  coverage  imposed  on 
workers  by  the compulsory first pillar,  a  more  or less large 
gap  is left to be  filled by the other two pillars. Virtually 
no  state pension  scheme  fully  satisfies the  expectations  of 
all  categories  of  workers,  although  low-paid  workers  may 
find  it possible,  in  many  Member  States,  to  maintain  their 
living standard during retirement. 
2.2.4  Higher-paid  workers,  by  contrast,  will,  in  almost 
all  Member  States,  not  be  able  to  maintain  their  living 
standard  during  retirement  by  relying  exclusively  on  the 
first  pillar,  especially  if  the  first  pillar  pays  a  flat 
rate  pension  to  all  residents  of  a  country.  Statutory 
pension  schemes  which  calculate  benefits  only  on  the  basis 
of  income  below  an  upper  earnings  limit or  which  offer only 
a  low  replacement  rate  (the  amount  of  the  state  pension 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  earnings  before  retirement) 
will also  leave more  scope  for  the  second  and third pillars. 
2. 2. 5  Whether  and  how  the  second  pillar  fills  the  gap 
left by  the  statutory pension  scheme  depends  on  the  general 
legal  framework  in  which  .occupational  pension  schemes  can 
operate  and  on  their  fiscal  status.  Governments  usually 
grant  tax deductibility at both  employer  and  employee  level 
for  contributions  to  pension  schemes.  Some  Member  States 
limit  the  deductible  amount  for  contributions.  Most  Member 
States  do  not  tax  investment  income  of  pension  funds  By 
contrast,  benefits,  i.e.  pensions,  are  usually  taxable. 
Pension  schemes  wishing  to  benefit  from  a  favourable  tax 
status will have  to conform to certain conditions set by  the 
legislator.  Thus  governments  have  an  indirect  way  of 
influencing such  schemes. 
2.2.6  Some  countries  also  regulate  pension  schemes 
directly,  subjecting  them  to  more  or  less  stringent  rules 
concerning  such  matters  as  financial  management,  d-isclosure 
of  information  about  the  rights  of  beneficiaries  and  the 
financial  situation  of  the  scheme,  participation·  of Ccnr.munication -on  supp.le.mentary ,.pension  schemes  8. 
beneficiaries  in  _.running .  the  -scheme,  -reva-luation"  ·of 
benefits,  vesting .requirements  (minimum  periods  of  scheme 
membership) . and  the  eligibility  for  scheme . membership  and· 
benefits. 
2.2.7  Public policy also seems  to, have  some  influence  on 
the  extent  to ·.which  a  fruitful  cooperation  between  the -two_· 
sides  of  industry ·can.  develop  in  the  area  of ·pension. 
schemes.  In :the  most.  extreme  case,  the  legislator  can  make. 
mandatory  for  a  whole  industry,· profession.  or  even  the 
entire  workforce  of  a  country  a  pension  scheme  based·.  on  a 
collective  agreement.  But·  even  if  .there  .is  such  .strong 
government.  back'ing  "for ·supplementary ·pens  ion · schemes,  the 
initiative· for ·establishing a  scheme  remains  in the.hands of 
the private sector. 
2.3  Financing methods of pen'Sion  schemes· 
2.3.1  The  financing  methods. of  supplementary  schemes  are 
very  different  as  well.  Whilst  in  most  countries  different 
financing  methods  coexist,  particular  methods  tend  to  .be 
dominant  in different  countries,  usually  depending.on  which 
methods  are  encouraged  (or  even  prescribed)  or  discouraged 
by  the  authorities.  Three  ·types  can  be  distinguished:  In 
most  countries  pre-funding  tends  to- be  very  common.  This. 
means  that  contributions  are  used  to  build  up  a  capital 
stock  (regularly  increased  by  investment  returns  on  the 
capital  accumulated  in  the  past)  which  is  deemed  to  be 
sufficient to meet the pension promises which  have  been made 
to  the  members  of  a  scheme.  Many  Member  States  require 
pension  promises  to.be backed  up  by  such  a  capital  fund  the 
assets  of  which  can  be  held  and  managed  by  a  pension  fund 
for the exclusive benefit of its members  or in the  form  of  a 
group  insurance contract with  a  life assurance  company. 
2.3.2  Some  countries  allow  an  alternative  approach, 
namely  book  reserves.  Rather  than  accumulating  real  or 
financial assets which  can  be  liquidated in order to pay  out 
pensions,  firms  retain  the  contributions  and  pay  pensions 
out of their revenue.  Expected pension liabilities are shown 
in the  balance  sheet.  This  financing  method  works  under  the 
assumption that the  company will generate sufficient revenue 
for  as  long  as  pension  liabilities  are  still  outstanding, 
i.e.  possibly half  a  century  into the future.  If the company 
collapses  or  shrinks  significantly,  then  possibly  not  all 
promised  pensions  can  be  paid.  As.  a  result,  national 
authorities may  require companies  to pay contributions to  an 
insolvency  insurance  scheme  which  can  guarantee  pension 
liabilities in the event of  insolvency of the employer. 
2.3.3  A  third  financing  method,  'pay-as-you-go',  is 
typical  of  statutory pension  schemes  but  rather  exceptional 
in the  case  of  occupational  pensions.  Under  this  method,  no 
(or  only  insignificant)· capital  reserves  are  accumulated  to 
back  up  pension  promises.  The  contributions  are  used  to  pay 
out  directly  the  benefits .of __ current  pensioners.  Similarly 9 
to book  reserve  schemes,  the pay-as-you-go  system requires  a 
certain  stability,  alb~  it  of  a  somewhat  different  nature. 
Benefit payments to pensioners  in a  pay-as-you-go  scheme  are 
only  guaranteed  if  there  is  a  regular  contribution  income 
which  requires  a  more  or  less  constant  intake  of  young 
scheme  members  to  pay  these  contributions.  Alternatively, 
the  scheme  could be  backed  by  a  state guarantee.  Demographic 
decline  or  decreasing  earnings  (e.g.  as  a  result  of  high 
unemployment)  will  have  immediate  repercussions  on  the 
financial  equilibrium  of  pay-as-you-go  schemes,  requ1.r1.ng 
either  benefits  to  be  lowered  or  contribution  rates  to  be 
raised. 
2.3.4  The  constant  flow  of  contribution  income  which  is 
necessary  for  the  long-term  financial  stability  of  pay-as-
you-go  schemes  can  be  ensured  through  compulsory  membership 
being  applied  to  as  large  a  group  of  workers  as  possible. 
Alternatively,  the  higher  risks  of  membership  fluctuations 
in  small  schemes  can  be  pooled,  and  thereby  reduced,  if 
several  schemes  agree  on  transfer  payments  compensating  for 
strong  demographic  or  economic  fluctuations  affecting  only 
particular  schemes.  The  pay-as-you-go  financing  method  is 
normally  not  considered  suitable  for  occupational  pensions 
which  are  organised  on  a  company  or  sectoral  level  or  for  a 
particular  profession  where  fluctuations  in  potential 
membership  can  be  important.  Most  second-pillar  pension 
schemes  are therefore pre-funded. 
2 • 3 . 5  Even  if  they  cannot  recruit  new  members,  pre-
funded pension schemes  should normally have sufficient funds 
to  enable  them  to  pay  the  promised  benefits  until  the  last 
survivor  of  the  last pensioner  dies.  They  therefore  appear 
to  be  immune  to  changes  in  the  number  of  active  members  in 
the scheme.  This  lets funded  schemes  appear  as  an attractive 
alternative  to  pay-as-you-go  schemes  in  the  light  of  the 
forthcoming deterioration of the demographic  balance  between 
workers  and pensioners. 
2.4  Demographic  change  and  supplementary pension  schemes 
2.4.1  In  future  decades,  far  fewer  workers  will  have  to 
sustain  a  largely  increased  number  of  pensioners.  This  is 
widely  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  (mostly  statutory}  pay-as-
you-go  pension  schemes  which,  in  order  to  maintain  their 
financial  equilibrium,  will  either  have  to  raise 
contribution  rates  or  reduce  benefits  to  future  pensio~ers 
(by  cutting  the  benefit  rate  or  by  shortening  the  pericd 
during  which  they  are paid,  i.e.  by  raising the  pensionable 
age) .  As  far  as  the  statutory  schemes  are  concerned, 
governments  will  probably  try  to  strike  a  balance  between 
the  interests  of  workers  and  pensioners  by  using  a 
combination  of  these  possible  measures.  At  the  same  time, 
the  boundaries  between  pay-as-you-go  and  pre-funded 
retirement  provision  are  being  reconsidered  on  the  grounds 
that  pre-funded  schemes,  be  they  private  or  public,  are -
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perceived  to  be  more  robust  in  the  light  of  demographic 
changes. 
2.4.2  This  perception  of  pre-funded  private  pension 
schemes  as  being  relatively  1mmune  against  demographic 
change may,  however,  be  illusory.  The  implicit effect of  any 
form  of  pension  provision,  regardless  of  the  financing 
method,  is to share  the  resources  available  for  consumption 
between  workers  and  pensioners.  As  the  demographic  balance 
between these two  groups  changes,  so  do  the possibilities of 
channelling  resources  towards  the  pensioners.  Pre-funding 
can  only  overcome  this  basic  problem  if  it  increases  the 
total  resources  available  for  consumption  by  a  given 
community  several  decades  after  the  funding  has  actually 
taken  place.  This  will  only  be  the  case if either the  funds 
set aside for  future  pensioners  are  invested  abroad  through 
a  positive  trade  balance  followed  by  a  trade  deficit  when 
the  pensions  are  due,  or  if  pre-funding  increases  the 
production  equipment  of  the  economy  so  that it becomes  more 
productive  and  can  hence  more  easily  afford  the  future 
expenditure  on  pensions.  Whether  pre-funding  does  actually 
have  these  effects  on  available  resources  in  the  future  is 
subject  to  controversy.  Nevertheless,  pre-funding  may  in  a 
sense  improve  the  bargaining  position  of  pensioners  in  as 
much  as  they  hold  assets  to  back  their  claim  on  the 
available resources.  The value of these assets may,  however, 
effectively  be  reduced,  whether  through  the  normal  market 
mechanism  of  supply  and  demand  (which  is  likely  to reflect 
the  demographic  balance),  through  inflation  or  through 
direct political measures  such as property taxation. 
2. 4. 3  The  development  of  pre-funded  pension  schemes  or 
the  accumulation  of  substantial reserves  in current  pay-as-
you-go  schemes  could  also  have  major  effects  on  the  economy 
of  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States.  In  the 
light  of  the  current  world-wide  shortage  of  savings  (or 
rather  investment)  a  more widespread use of pre-funding as  a 
financing  method  for  retirement  provision  might  be  welcome 
as  a  source of  long-term capital and hence as  a  contribution 
towards  faster  non-inflationary  growth.  In  the  short  run, 
however,  the  effects  on  aggregate  demand  would  have  to  be 
taken  into  account  which  might  result  in  increased 
contractual  household  savings  (through  pension  funds  and 
insurance  companies)  being  offset  by  lower  savings  in  the 
corporate  sector  resulting  from  diminished  profits.  As  a 
result,  given  the  considerable  macroeconomic  importance  of 
financial  flows  related to retirement  provision,  any  change 
in  the  way  pensions  are  financed  is  likely  to  have  far-
reaching  consequences  and  should  therefore  be  carefully 
considered  in  the  light  of  the  macroeconomic  situation  of 
the  moment.  This  is  all  the  more  important  as  sustained 
economic  growth  resulting  in  the  creation  of  more  and 
productive  jobs  is  crucial  for  reducing  the  relative 
financial  burden  of  pension  expenditure  and  for  extending 
the room  for manoeuvre  of governments. .C:ommun'l:ca:t:iorr:  on··:suppilemen~ey~pension::·sch'emes 
2. 4. 4  The  effects  of  national  decisions  regarding  the 
financing of retirement provision will also almost certainly 
spill over the national borders.  For this reason it would  be 
crucially  important  for  the  Community  to  establish  an 
exchange  of  information  and  to  stimulate  closer  cooperation 
among  the Member  States on  these matters. 
2.5  Social  policy  objectives  and  the  regulation  of 
supplementary pension  schemes 
2.5.1  Occupational pension  schemes will not  just reflect 
the  need  of  workers  to  increase  their  retirement  provision 
in  view  of  the  insufficiency  of  statutory  schemes.  If  they 
are  set up  by  employers,  they will typically respond  to the 
employer's  need  to  attract  and  retain  qualified  employees. 
These  requirements  in  terms  of  personnel  management  will 
therefore  influence  the  design  of  occupational  pension 
schemes.  By  granting  benefits  preferably  to  employees  who 
worked  for  the  same  employer  for  many  years  or  even  until 
retirement,  employers  can  reduce  their  employee  turnover. 
There  are  indeed  some  schemes  which  will  pay  benefits  only 
to  workers  who  retire  from  employment  with  the  particular 
company  for  which  the  scheme  was  set  up.  Such  arrangements 
linking  benefit  entitlements  to  a  worker's  employment 
history with  a  particular company will obviously make  labour 
mobility more  costly for  employees.  They will also  slow down 
the  development.  of  new  and  fast  growing  sectors,  as 
employers  in  these  sectors  would  find  it  very  costly  to 
recruit labour,  and skilled workers  in particular. 
2.5.2  Occupational  pension  schemes  will  also  enable 
employers  and  workers  to  save  on  tax  to  the  extent  that 
contributions to pension schemes  are tax deductible.  Even if 
benefits  are  eventually  taxed  (as  is  usually  the  case), 
workers  can  sometimes  reduce  their  life-time  tax  bill  by 
avoiding  the  higher  marginal  tax  rates  to  which  they  would 
normally  be  exposed  during  their  periods  of  well-paid 
employment. 
2.5.3  Given  these  additional  roles  of  supplementary 
pension  schemes  as  personnel management  tools and tax saving 
device,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  these  schemes  will 
automatically  contribute  to  the  social  policy  objective  of 
an  adequate  and  secure  level  of  income  replacement  for  all 
retired  workers,  regardless  of  their  particular  employment 
history.  This  objective  is  reflected  in  a  more  or  less 
strict  regulation  and  supervision  of  pension  schemes.  In 
various  countries,  many  of  these  legal  obligations  result 
from  court  rulings  which  sometimes  have  to  fill  a  'legal 
vacuum • .  However,  to  the  extent  that  many  supplementary 
pension  schemes  are  voluntary,  governments  have  to  accept 
that  such  schemes  are  not  perfect  in  terms  of  their public 
policy  objective  and  may  refrain  from  preventing  employers 
from  using  their  pensions  schemes  also  as  a  personnel 
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2. 5. 4  Regulation  of  supplementary  pension  schemes  is  a 
complex  issue  and  its effects  on  the  development  of  private 
retirement  provision  in  the  second  pillar  are  difficult  to 
assess.  Whilst  it is possible  that  regulation  leads  to  the 
creation  of  (especially  compulsory)  supplementary  schemes, 
there is some  fear that tight regulations might  increase the 
reluctance  of  some  employers  to  set  up  and  maintain 
-occupational  schemes.  In  practice,  however,  there  certainly 
does  not  appear  to  be  a  positive  correlation  between  the 
absence of regulations  and the  importance of  such  schemes  in 
the various Member  States. 
2.5.5  What  seems to be  important,  for the development  of 
voluntary occupational schemes,  is the quality and stabiJity· 
of  this  legal  framework  which  directly affects  the  expected 
cost of  running  a  benefit programme.  Sudden  changes  in this 
legal  framework  make  it  very  difficult  for  employers  to 
calculate  the  real  long-term  cost  of  their  benefit  schemes 
which  has  to  be  assessed  over  several  decades.  Legislation, 
while  improving  the  social  protection  of  workers,  can  also 
provide  guidance  for  employers  who  want  to  set  up 
occupational  pension  schemes  and  who  have  a  large  choice  of 
possible  pension  scheme  designs.  As  a  result,  it would  be 
wrong  to consider that regulation of occupational retirement 
provision  is  an  area  where  the  interests  of  employers, 
workers,  pensioners  and  the  government  will  necessarily 
clash.  Legislation  recently  introduced  in  various  Member 
states proves that a  consensual  approach  is possible and can 
be  very  fruitful.  This  need  for  stability  of  the  legal 
framework  will  have  to  be  taken  into  account  by  any  public 
policy  dealing  with  voluntary  occupational  retirement 
provision.  This  is  true  at  both  Community  and  national 
level. 
2. 5. 6  There  has  been  only  very  limited  regulation  of 
supplementary  pension  schemes  at  Community  level.  Two 
directives were  adopted  asking  Member  States  to protect the 
interest  of  current  and  past  workers  also  as  far  as  their 
supplementary  social  security rights  are  concerned.  The  two 
directives apply only to very specific circumstances,  namely 
the  transfer  of  ownership  of  undertakings,  businesses  or 
parts  of  businesses6  and  the  case  of  insolvency  of  an 
employer.? 
2.5.7  Another  respect  in  which  occupational  schemes  are 
regulated  at  Community  level  is  the  equality  of  treatment 
between men  and  women.  In this area,  a  directive was  adopted 
by the Council  in 19868  and  a  further directive was  proposed 
by  the  Commission  in  1987,  with  the  aim  of  eliminating 
different  treatment  of  men  and  women,  also  as  far  as  the 
6  Directive 187(77)EEC,  OJEC  n.  L  61  of  5  March  1977. 
7  Directive  987(80)EEC,  OJEC  n.  L  283  of  28  october  1980. 
8  Directive  378(86)EEC,  OJEC  n.  L  225  of  12  August  1986. Communication  on  supplementary pension schemes  13 
pensionable  age  and  survivors'  benefits  are  concerned.9 
Furthermore,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities  consistently  maintained  the  view  that 
occupational retirement benefits are to be  considered as pay 
in the meaning  of  article  119  of  the Treaty.10  This  article 
outlaws  pay  discrimination  based  on  sex.  The  most  recent 
judgment  in the Barber  case  (see  note  10)  is likely to have 
an  impact  on  the  desirable  equalisation  of  pensionable  ages 
for  men  and  women  in statutory schemes  as well. 
2.5.8  Commission  proposals  for  directives  concerning 
certain  employment  relationships,  namely  part-time, 
temporary  and  interim  employment,  are  currently  before  the 
Council.  One  of  these  directives  would  require  that workers 
in  these  particular  employment  relationships  will  be 
afforded  social  protection  under  statutory  and  occupational 
social security schemes  in the same  foundations  and the same 
criteria as workers  in full-time  employment  of  indeterminate 
duration. 11  Adoption  of  this  directive  might  increase  the 
number  of  employees  being covered by  such  schemes. 
2.5.9  In  its  Action  Programme  relating  to  the 
implementation  of  the  Community  Charter  on  Fundamental 
Social Rights  for  Workers12  the  Commission  also  announced  a 
proposal  for  a  recommendation  on  the  convergence  of 
objectives  and  policies  in  the  area  of  social  protection. 
The  aim  of  this  convergence. strategy  is  not  to  promote  a 
harmonisation  of  the  national  designs  of  social  security 
systems but to achieve  a  greater similarity in the degree of 
social  protection  offered  to  workers  throughout  the 
Community. 
2.5.10  The  second  life  assurance  directive  adopted  on  8 
November  199013  also  covers  group  assurance  and  will,  as  a 
result,  enable  pension  schemes  to  finance  their liabilities 
by using  an  insurance contract with  a  life assurance  company 
established  anywhere  in  the  Community.  It will  also  become 
possible  to  establish,  in  the  form  of  a  captive  life 
assurance  company,  a  single  financing  vehicle  for  all 
national  pension  schemes  of  a  multinational  employer.  The 
possibility  of  opening  up  similar possibilities  for  pension 
funds  is currently being examined  by  Commission  services and 
9  COM(87)494  final. 
10  See  in  particular  the  judgments  of  the  Court  of  13  May 
1986  in  Case  C-170/84  between  Bilka-Kaufhaus  GmbH  and  Karin 
Weber  von Hartz,  and  of  17  May  1990  in case  C-262/88  between 
Douglas  Harvey  Barber  and  Guardian  Royal  Exchange  Assurance 
Group. 
11  Proposal  for  a  Council  directive  on  certain  employment 
relationships  with  regard  to  distortions  of  competition. 
COM(90)  228  final  - SYN  280  of  13  August  1990. 
12  See  above,  note  2. 
13  Directive  619(90}EEC,  OJEC  n.  L  330  of  29  November  1990. ci.vil  servants  from  the  Member  States.  A  p~ns:i.on  ):':.md 
directivE:;,  to  be  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  t~;::;  nr:ar 
future,  would  achieve  some  progress  in  this  direction  3.rl.f~ 
allow  cross-border  financing  arrangements  also  in  tha  case 
of pension funds. 
2.5~11 ··  ·pension  schemes ·are· also likely tc  benefit from  an· 
increased  freedom  to  invest  throughout  the  Community. 
council  Directive  88/361/EEC  of  24.6.1988  impleme::.1'i:..i.n·c; 
A~ticle  67  of  the  Treaty  liberalises  completely  ~nd 
unconditionally all capital movements  in the Community  as  ~f 
1  July  1990.  Within  this  legal  framework  some  prudential 
rules  imposed  by  Member  states  on  institutional  investors 
such  as  pension  funds  will have  to  be  reconsidered  in order 
to  eliminate  any  remaining  direct  or  indirect  obstacles  to 
the  freedom  to  invest  anywhere  in  the  Community  which  are 
not  justif-ied  by  the  exchange- rate  risk..  The.  Commission 
takes  the  view  that,  prima  facie,  some  restrictions  (e.g. 
localisation  requirements,  minimum  investments  in  certain 
instruments,  any  restrictions  or  conditions  discriminating 
against  investments  in  shares  or  bonds  issued  or  listed  in 
other  Member  States)  go  well  beyond  what  is  necessary  for 
prudential  reasons.  It will  take  the  appropriate  steps  in 
the  near  future  in  order  to  ensure  that  these  restrictions 
are  either  abolished  or  changed  so  as  to  become  compatible 
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l.  The  implications  of  supplamantary  pension  schemes  for 
freedom  of movement  of workers 
3 .1  Coordination  of  statutory  social  security  schemes  and 
its applicability to supplementary pension  schemes 
3 .1.1  Freedom  of  movement  for  workers  is  one  of  the 
basic constituents of the  common  market,14  a  market  not only 
for  goods  and  services,  i.e. the economies'  output,  but also 
for  production  factors,  i.e.  labour  and  capital.  currently, 
the  European  Community  is  moving  even  further,  towards  a 
freedom  of  movement  of  all  persons.15  It was  already  clear 
at  the  time  of  the  drafting  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  the 
European  Economic  Community  that,  in  the  absence  of 
Community  guarantees  for  the  social  security  rights  of 
migrant  workers,  labour  mobility within  the  Community  would 
still  remain  severely  limited  by  national  boundaries  as 
workers  could  not  afford  losing  their  pension  rights  or 
their  rights  to  adequate  cover  against  health  and  other 
social risks.  The territorial limitations of national social 
security  schemes  had  to  be  overcome,  enabling  workers  and 
pensioners  to  draw  statutory  benefits  anywhere  in  the 
Community  and  to  aggregate,  to  the  extent  that  this  is 
required  by  the  legislations  of  the  Member  States,  periods 
of  work,  contribution  payment  or  residence  which  are 
necessary  for  the  acquisition  of  rights.  Article  51  of  the 
Treaty therefore states that: 
The  Council  shall,  acting  unanimously  on  a 
proposal  from  the  Commission,  adopt  such  measures 
in  the  field  of  social  security  as  are  necessary 
to  provide  freedom  of  movement  for  workers;  to 
this end,  it shall make  arrangements to secure for 
migrant workers  and their dependents: 
(a)  aggregation,  for the  purpose  of acquiring and 
retaining  the  right  to  benefit  and  of  the 
calculation  of  benefit,  of all periods  taken  into 
account under  the  laws  of the several countries; 
(b)  payment  of  benefits  to  persons  resident  in 
the territories of Member  States. 
3.1.2  The  rules  indicated  in article  51  were  applied to 
statutory  social  security  schemes  .where  obstacles  to  the 
free  movement  of  workers  have  been  largely  eliminated.  The 
arrangements  referred  to  · in  article  51  are  known  as 
'coordination of  social  security  systems'  the  precise rules 
of  which  were  laid  down  in  regulations  (EEC)  1408/71  and 
14  See  Article  48  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community.  · 
.15  Article Sa  of the Treaty  and  the recent directives  on the 
right  of  residence,  364(90)EEC,  365(90)EEC  and  366(90)EEC/ 
all published  in the OJEC  n.  L  180  of  13  July  1990. Commu-nication  on  supplel":<entary  pension  schemes  ...  16" 
574/72.  However,  these  regulations  have  never  been  extended 
to supplementary social security schemes,  nor have  analogous 
lagislative .instruments -ever  been  adopted  in this area. 
3.1.3  In  fact,  the  rules ·specifically  mentioned  ·in 
article  51  are  less  pertinent  in  the  case  of  supplementary 
schemes  than  they  are  in  the  case  of  statutory  schemes.  As 
far  as  the  second rule is concerned  (indent  (b)),  it has  to 
be  noted  that  the· payment  of  supplementary  benefits  is  in 
principle  already  possible  anywhere  in  the  Community.  Any 
restrictions  on  transfers  of  benefits  or  accumul-ated 
contributions  from  supplementary  pension  schemes  would  be 
contrary  to  the  principle  of  free  movement  of  capital.  16 
Furthermore,  being  private  institutions,  supplementary 
pension  schemes  are  most  unlikely  to  be  able  to  impose  any 
conditions  of  residence  on  beneficiaries.  In  practice,  the 
exportability  of  supplementary  benefits,  unlike  statutory 
benefits  in  the  absence  of  coordination,  does  not  seem  to 
pose  any major  problems. 
3.1.4  Whilst  the  second  rule  (indent  (b)  of  article  51) 
makes  statutory  social  security  benefits  exportable,  the 
first rule  (indent  (a))  deals with the acquisition of rights 
to such benefits.  The  aim  is to make  it immaterial,  for  the 
acquisition  of  statutory  social  security  rights,  whether  a 
worker  has  spent  his/her  whole  working  life  in  a  single 
country or whether hejshe has worked  in several countries of 
the  Community.  This  puts  migrant  and  non-migrant  workers  on 
an  equal  footing. 
3.1.5  The  method  indicated  in  indent  (a)  of  article  51 
for  achieving  this· purpose  addresses  a  clear  handicap  for 
cross-border migrant workers.  National  job changers would  be 
able to acquire  social  security rights,  no  matter  how  often 
they  changed  jobs  within  a  given  country.  By  contrast,  in 
the  absence  of  coordination  of  national  social  security 
systems,  a  migrant  worker  who  worked  in  several  countries 
might  fail  to  complete  the  minimum  service  periods  for 
acquiring  a  right  to  social  security  benefits  in  each  of 
hisjher  countries  of  employment  and  thus  remain  without 
social  security  during  the  entire  career.  As  a  result, 
cross-border  mobility  would  have  exposed  workers  to 
unacceptable  risks.  The  difference  between  cross-border 
mobility  and  intra-national mobility is not  as  important  in 
the  case  of  supplementary  social  security  schemes  because, 
in  many  cases,  even  intra-national  mobility  can  make  the 
acquisition  of  (supplementary)  social  security  rights  more 
difficult or even  impossible. 
3.1.6  Coordination  essentially  addresses  the 
penalisation  of  cross-border  mobility  compared  to  intra-
national mobility.  This  penalisation does  also  exist  in the 
16  See  Council  directive  88(36l)EEC  of  24  June  1988  for  the 
implementation of article 67  of .. the .Treaty,  OJEC  n.  L  17  8  of 
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case  of  supplementary  schemes,  given  that  obstacles  to 
mobility  may  already  have  been  eliminated  at  the  national 
level  or  to  the  extent  that  sectoral  schemes  are  dominant 
and  most  of  the  labour  mobility  takes  place  within  a  given 
sector.  However,  the ·main  public  policy  issue,  as  far  as 
supplementary  pension  schemes  are  concerned,  is  to 
facilitate  labour  mobility,  and  hence  labour  market 
flexibility,  and  to  ensure  that  job· changers  are  not 
penalised  as  far  as  their  social  protection  is  concerned. 
The  problems  for  migrant  workers  in  the  case  of 
supplementary  schemes  are,  on  the  whole,  of  a  different 
nature  from  those  which  arise  in  the  area  of  statutory 
social  security  schemes,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  following 
paragraphs.  A  different  approach  is therefore  necessary  and 
the  methods  of  coordination,  as  they  are  laid  down,  on  the 
basis of article 51,  in regulation 1408/71,  are difficult to 
apply,  as  such,  to supplementary  schemes. 
3.2  Supplementary  pension  schemes  and obstacles to the  free 
movement of workers 
3. 2.1  Supplementary  pension  schemes  would  normally 
privilege  the  interests  of  current  scheme  members,  as 
opposed to scheme  leavers  (i.e.  workers  who  leave the scheme 
before  retirement  and  either  take  their  rights  out  of  the 
scheme  or  maintain  their  rights  in  it).  Many  features  of 
such  schemes  will  penalise  scheme  leavers,  and  individuals 
who  frequently  change  jobs would usually finish their career 
with  significantly  reduced  benefit  entitlements.  This 
problem  has  to  be  addressed  at  the  Community  level  to  the 
extent  that  it  penalises  cross-border  mobility  more  that 
intra-national mobility. 
Acquisition of rights 
3.2.2  Vesting  requirements  and  waiting  periods  can  be  a 
particularly  important  cause  for  reduced  pension 
entitlements  after  a  career  with  frequent  job  changes. 
Waiting  periods  refer  to  the  time  one  has  to  be  employed 
with  a  company  before  becoming  eligible  for  benefits  from 
the  scheme.  By  vesting is meant the creation of  a  recognised 
pension  entitlement.  Usually,  conditions  for  vesting  cannot 
be set freely  by  employers  who  could,  in the absence of  such 
legal  constraints,  confer  a  pension  right  only  at the  time 
of  retirement.  Any  employee  leaving  a  job  before  retirement 
would  therefore  obtain  no  pension  entitlement  for  this 
particular  period  of  employment.  Consequently,  national 
legislations usually require rights to become vested and put 
limits  on  vesting  · periods,  but  these  limits  vary 
considerably  across  the  Community,  ranging  from  immediate 
vesting to vesting at retirement  . 
.  !·· .. 
3.2.3  Comparable  qualifying  conditions  do  also  exist  in 
the  case  of  statutory  social  security  schemes  but  their 
inconvenience  for  migrant  workers  was  removed  by  the 
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requires  national  authorities  to  assimilate  periods  served 
abroad to periods served in the domestic  economy.  Because of 
their  diversity  and  large  number,  it  is  difficult  to 
conceive  how  a  similar  rule  of  aggregation  of  service 
periods could be  imposed  on  supplementary pension schemes. 
Preservation or transfer 
3. 2. 4  If  a  job  leaver  has  obtained  a  vested  right  it 
will  be  necessary to decide  what  to  do  with this right.  Two 
possibilities exist:  Rights  can be  maintained  in the pension 
scheme  in which  they  were  acquired,  and  the  job  leaver will 
be  able  to  draw  a  pension  from  this  scheme  once  hejshe 
retires.  The  alternative  is  to  pay  out  a  capital  value 
representing  acquired  rights.17  This  capital  value  can  then 
be  used to  buy  a  deferred annuity  from  an  insurance  company 
or to pay it into the  new  pension  scheme,  provided of course 
the  new  scheme  accepts the transfer. 
3 . 2 .. 5  Capital  transfers  seem  to  be  a  straightforward 
solution  in  the  case  of  funded  pension  schemes,  but  would 
not  normally  be  used  in  the  case  of  book  reserve  plans  and 
pay-as-you-go  schemes,  both  of  which  do  not  set  aside 
financial assets to back up  their pension promises.  Many  job 
changers will therefore  only  have  the  option  of  maintaining 
their  rights  in  the  previous  pension  scheme18.  In  either 
case  - transfer or preservation  - future  pay  rises will not 
normally  be  taken  into  account  as  they  would  be  after  an 
uninterrupted career with the same  employer.  Frequently,  not 
even  (expected,  in the  case  of  a  transfer)  price or  average 
earnings rises  are  taken  into  account  for  the  adjustment  of 
preserved rights  or  for  the calculation  of  transfer values. 
As  a  result,  there  is  a  tendency  for  scheme  leavers  not  to 
get their fair share out of  a  pension  fund. 
3.2.6  Long  vesting  and  waiting  periods,  calculations  of 
transfer values which penalise scheme  leavers and  inadequate 
preservation  of  v dormant'  rights  are  severe  obstacles  to 
labour  mobility.  In  the  presence  of  these  obstacles  the 
contribution  of  occupational  pensions  to  the  total 
retirement  incomes  of  workers  will  depend  on  careers  which 
are  characterised  by  long,  uninterrupted  periods  of 
employment  with  the  same  company  or  employer.  The  social 
policy  goal  of  guaranteeing  an  adequate  retirement  income 
will  not  be  achieved  for  workers  with  a  more  mobile  career 
profile. 
17  Ideally,  this  capital  value  includes  both  employer  and 
employee  contributions  as  well  as  accrued  interest  at  a 
realistic rate. 
18  This  would  also  be  the  case  if  the  new  employment 
relation does  not  provide  for  membership  in  an  occupational 
pension scheme. Communication  on  supplementary pension  schemes  19 
3. 2. 7  One  particular  category  of  workers  likely  to  be 
most  affected  by  this  implicit  preference  for  long-term 
employees  are  women.  Many  .of  them  tend  to  interrupt  their 
careers  for  family  reasons.  When  they  return  to  the  labour 
market,  they  may  not  resume  employment  with  the  same 
employer  and they may  only be able to get part-time jobs and 
not  very  secure  employment.  As  a  result  of  vesting  and 
waiting  periods,  ,unfavourable  transfers  and  inadequate 
preservation of  'dormant'  pension  rights,  women  will  be  far 
more  likely  than  men  to  receive  insufficient  occupational 
retirement benefits.  This  will  be  especially  problematic  in 
countries  where  occupational  pensions  are  supposed  to  be  a 
major  source of retirement  income. 
Taxation of transfers 
3.2.8  A  problem which specifically affects international 
migrant workers  is related to taxes.  Tax authorities usually 
grant  tax  exemptions  for  contributions  to  and  investment 
income  of  pension  schemes,  but  they  expect  to  be  able  to 
levy  income  tax  on  the  retirement  benefit  once  the  worker 
has retired.  This will  not  be  the  case  if the capital value 
of contributions and  accrued  interest is transferred abroad. 
National  tax  authorities  will  not  be  able  to  ensure  that 
this  accumulated  untaxed  income  will  indeed  be  used  for 
financing  a  pension.  Nor  will  they  be  able  to  tax  these 
retirement benefits if they are paid out abroad by  a  foreign 
pension  scheme.  As  a  result,  national  tax  authorities  may 
levy  very  substantial  taxes  on  transfer  values,  making  such 
transfers  far  too  costly  for  migrant  workers.  Their  only 
option  is  then  to  maintain  their  rights  in  their  previous 
pension  fund  which  may  not  adequately  preserve  the  real 
value of the pension rights. 
3 . 3  Improving  the  social  protection  of  workers  and 
facilitating their mobility:  possible solutions 
Cross-border membership? 
3. 3.1  Changing  from  one  occupational  pension  scheme  to 
another  (or none at all)  may,  because of vesting and waiting 
periods,  make  it  more  difficult  for  a  worker  to  acquire 
supplementary  pension  rights  and  will  almost  always  result 
in  the  loss  of  a  substantial  part  of  the  supplementary 
pension  one  can  expect  upon  retirement.  A  first  approach 
could  therefore  consist  in  avoiding,  whenever  this  is 
possible,  a  change  to  a  different  pension  scheme  and  the 
resultant  losses  in  terms  of  social  security  rights.  For 
cross-border  migrant  workers,  this  would  imply  cross-border 
membership  in  pension  funds.  However,  cross-border 
membership  of  individual  migrant  workers  will  only  be  an 
option  in  a  minority  of  cases.  It requires  the  possibility 
to  remain  in the previous  pension  scheme,  acceptance  of  the 
new  employer  to  pay  contributions to the  employees  previous 
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finally,  the  absence,  in  both  the 
countries  of  employment,  of  legal 
membership  in a  foreign  fund. 
present  and  previous 
obstacles  prohibiting 
3. 3. 2  If  the  employment  in  another  country  is  intended 
to  be  of  short  duration,  then  the  possibility  exists  for  a 
worker  to  remain  covered,  for  up  to  one  year19,  by  the 
statutory  social  security  schemes  of  hisjher  country  of 
origin.  Because  of  the  complementarity  of  statutory  and 
supplementary  schemes,  short-term  migrant  workers  should 
also  be  given  the  possibility  to  remain  in  their  previous 
supplementary  schemev  if  it  could  be  expected  that  they 
would  have  to  rejoin  the  same  scheme  after  returning  from 
their  employment  abroad.  The  tax  rules  of  the  country  of 
employment  should  allow  the  tax  deductibility  of 
contributions  paid  into  a  pension  scheme  established  in 
another  country  if  this  scheme  enjoys  the  favourable  tax 
status in its own  country.  It should be pointed out that the 
Commission  has  launched  a  certain  number  of  infringement 
procedures  against various  Member  States  in order  to  ensure 
the  tax  deductibility  of  life  insurance  premiums  paid  to 
companies  established in another Member  State under the  same 
conditions as  for  premiums  paid to  a  domestic  company. 
3.3.3  The  Commission  services  have  recently  put  forward 
some  ideas  on  cross-border  membership  of  pension  funds  in  a 
working  paper  issued  towards  the  end  of  1990.  These  would 
deal with the problem of at least one particular category of 
migrant workers,  namely  those  who,  during  their career,  are 
employed  by different companies  or subsidiaries belonging to 
the  same  multinational  group.  Particularly  for  these 
multinational  groups,  the  working  paper  suggested  to  remove 
the obstacles preventing them  from  creating a  single pension 
fund  for  all  their  employees  in  different  countries.  This 
would  of  course  include  a  large  majority  of  non-migrant 
workers  as  well  as  a  minority  of  cross-border  migrant 
workers. 
3.3.4  Progress  on  this more  general  objective  of  cross-
border membership  is however  complicated by the wide variety 
of  pension  arrangements  throughout  the  Community  and  the 
importance  of  not  undermining  the  social  and  political 
objectives  which  are  pursued  by  these  arrangements.  Any 
directive  on  this subject will  inevitably  be  limited  in  its 
scope  by  such  considerations.  In  some  respects  these 
considerations  may  be  of  less  importance  in  the  case  of 
individual  migrant  workers  and  it may  be  possible  to  make 
faster  or  more  direct  progress  in  this  area.  A  Community-
wide  pension fund,  whether for  individuals or larger groups, 
would  normally  wish  to provide different  benefits  depending 
on  the  country  of  employment  and  the  scope  of  statutory 
19  with the possibility of prolonging it for  a  further year; 
see  arficle  14  of  regulation  1408/71.  Article  17  of  the 
same  regulation provides for  even greater flexibility on the 
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social security benefits in that country.  It would also have 
to respect different legislative requirements. 
Facilitating the acquisition of rights 
3. 3. 5  Excessively  long  vesting  and  waiting  periods  can 
hinder  labour mobility  by  linking  an  adequate  pension  level 
too  strongly to  long  uninterrupted  service periods  with  the 
same  employer.  Labour  mobility  can  help  to  match  demand  and 
supply  on  the  labour  market.  This  is  of  particular 
importance  for  economies  with  an  ageing  workforce  and  small 
numbers  of  new  entrants  to  the  labour  market  who  might 
easily be channelled .into expanding sectors.  Shorter vesting 
and  waiting  periods  would  also  reduce  a  source  of  indirect 
discrimination  against  some  categories  of  workers,  most 
notably women  workers,  who  are most  likely to change  jobs or 
interrupt  their  careers.  Excessively  long  vesting  and 
waiting  periods  may  not  even  be  in  the  interests  of 
employers  as  their  benefit  promises  will  not  be  considered 
by  workers  as  a  good  substitute for  the direct  wage  and  may 
let  the  overall  compensation  package  appear  uncompetitive. 
Comparisons  between  Member  States of the  Community  show that 
voluntary  pension  schemes  do  exist  and  can  be  of 
considerable  importance  even  if vesting  and  waiting  periods 
are short or in the case of  immediate vesting. 
Protection of preserved rights 
3.3.6  The  principal  long-term  objective  in  the  area  of 
supplementary pension  schemes  should  be to ensure that every 
scheme  leaver  is  legally  entitled  to  maintain  acquired 
rights  in  a  pension  scheme  until  hefshe  retires.  Such 
deferred  benefits  should  be  revalued,  protecting  them 
against erosion through price inflation. 
A  fair transfer option 
3.3.7  The  preservation  of  rights  in  a  previous  pension 
scheme  should always  be  an  available option,  as transfers of 
capital values  may  not  be  possible  for  various  reasons.  The 
new  employment  may  not  offer  the  possibility  of  joining  a 
pension  scheme,  or  one  of  the  schemes  involved  may,  because 
of  its financing  method  (pay-as-you-go  or  book  reserves)  or 
for  fear  of  the  technical  difficulties  involved  with 
transfers,  refuse  to  give  or  receive  transfer  payments. 
However,  transfers  may  often  be  preferable,  either  because, 
deferred  benefits  are  less well  protected  against  inflation 
(or  do  not rise in line with earnings)  or because it may  not 
be  desirable  to  multiply  the  number  of  relatively  small 
benefit  entitlements  and  thereby  raise  administrative  costs 
of  pension  schemes.  If,  however,  the  transfer  option  is 
av~ilable,  then the scheme  leaver should be given the choice 
between  maintaining  rights  in  the  previous  scheme  or 
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.Better:  "information ·· 
3.3•8  Members  of supplementary pension  schemes  should  be 
entitled  to  full  ·and  ·regular  information  on  their 
supplementary  pension  rights  ..  They  should  be· enabled  ·to 
appreciate  the ·financial  consequences,  at  the  .moment  of 
their retirement,  -of . a  .job -change.  They  should be  given ·full 
information  on  t·he· transfer .value  they· could  expect,  and. on 
the  amount  of  retirement. benefits· they  would  eventually 
receive if they decide to maintain their rights within their 
present  . scheme.  The  underlying  assumptions  concerning. 
interest rates,  inflation~  earnings profile  and  revaluation. 
of  'dormant'  rights  .should  be  clearly  spelt  out.  This 
information  ·should  be  given  to  scheme  members  at  regular 
intervals  without  workers  having  to  request  it and  thereby 
possibly reveal their intention to quit. 
Fair actuarial  standards 
3.3.9  If mobility from  one  Member  State to another· is to 
be  promoted  it would  be  necessary  to  ensure  that  actuarial 
standards  applied  to transfers  do  not  represent  an  obstacle 
to  this  mobility.  The  assumptions  used  for  calculating  the 
(transferred or  preserved)  rights  of  a  scheme  leaver  should 
not  be  less  favourable  than  those  used  for  determining 
whether  a  pension  scheme  is.sufficiently funded. 
·Avoid double  taxation· 
3.3.10  A  solution has to be  found  to the problem of taxes 
on  transfer  values  representing  pension  rights  acquired 
within  a  previous  pension  scheme.  This  is  particularly 
important  for  workers  who  must  fear  that  their  benefit 
rights  are  insufficiently preserved  in the  previous  scheme. 
Whilst there should  be  safeguards that tax cannot  be  avoided 
completely  by  a  mobile  worker  or  pensioner,  Member  states 
should  ensure  that  migrant  worker  be  not  subjected  to  any 
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4.  Conclusion 
4.1  The  Community  should  recognise  the  principle  that  each 
worker  should  be  able  to  move  to  a  job  in  another  Member 
State  without  having  to  fear  any  undue  loss  of  rights  to 
future  retirement  benefits.  How  this  is  to  be  achieved  can 
be  left to a  very  large extent to each Member  State or those 
persons or groups  who  design  and  run  a  supplementary  scheme. 
Section  3.3  indicates  the  principal  alternatives  which  are 
available  in  order  to  achieve  this  goal.  Progress  along 
these  lines  would  facilitate  labour  mobility  and  thereby 
increase  the  performance  of  the  labour  market  and  hence  the 
European  economy  as  a  whole.  At  the  same  time,  the  direct 
and  indirect  discrimination  on  grounds  of  sex  has  to  be 
avoided  and  ways  could  be  sought  by  which  weaker  groups  of 
employees,  such as part-timers  and  temporary workers,  can be 
given  access to supplementary  schemes. 
4.2  Supplementary  pension  schemes  are  a  complex  issue, 
involving  many  different  players  at  different  levels.  For 
this  reason,  the  Community  could  and  should  stimulate 
efforts at all levels,  i.e.  the  Community,  the Member  States 
and  the social partners,  to remove  obstacles to cross-border 
mobility. 
4. 3  The  Commission  will  undertake  efforts  to  obtain  more 
and- better  information  on  supplementary  pension  schemes 
throughout the  Community.  Of  particular interest will be the 
monitoring  of  evolutions  at  the  national  level  and  the 
assessment  of  the  actual  or  potential  impact  of  various 
Community  measures  (see  above,  2. 5. 6  to  2. 5. 11)  on 
supplementary pension schemes. 
4.4  Finally,  the  Commission  will  also  focus  its  attention 
on  other  forms  of  supplementary  social  protection  where 
obstacles to mobility may  exist.  This  is particularly likely 
to  be  the  case  with  health  insurance  which  will  be  the 
subject  of  a  future  communication,  to  be  presented  to  the 
Council  before the  end of  1992. communicatio_"n  on  supplementary pensions,  appen~~ ix 
APPENDIX: 
Kay  characteristics of  supplementary pension schemes 
in the Member  states of the Community 
INTRODUCTION 
.i\1 
This  appendix  highlights  the  key  characteristics  of 
supplementary pension  schemes  in  each  of  the  Member  states. 
It is  by  no  means  comprehensive,  nor  can  the  same  type  and 
quantity  of  information  be  provided  for  each  country.  The 
main  purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the diversity 
of pension schemes  and of the national regulatory  frameworks 
in which they operate. 
As  a  result,  the  information  given  in  this  appendix  cannot 
be  considered  as  a  sufficient  basis  for  concrete  proposals 
with  a  view  to  improving  the  social  protection  of  mobile 
workers.  More  information on specific problem areas,  as they 
have  been  identified in the present communication,  will have 
to  be  requested  from  experts  working  in  government 
departments  and  in  institutions  connected  with  private 
retirement provision prior to the drafting  of  proposals  for 
concrete  improvements. 
BELGIUM 
The  statutory pension scheme is designed to cover the entire 
active  population,  offering  a  relatively  high  level  of 
earnings related retirement benefits.20 
Supplementary  schemes  are  usually  set  up  at  the  initiative 
of  the  employer,  although  some  industry-wide  schemes  based 
on collective agreements  do  exist and  employee  contributions 
are common. 
Recent  legislation  (1985)  outlawed  book  reserve  plans  and 
left  a  choice  between  group  insurance  and  pension  funds  as 
financing  vehicles  for  pension  schemes.  Pension  funds  are 
jointly  managed  by  the  two  sides  of  industry.  Employer 
contributions  to  group  insurance  plans  are  subject  to  a 
social security levy. 
The  Belgian  government  proposed  in  1987  a  bill  on 
occupational  pension  schemes.  One  of  the  aims  of  this 
initiative  was  to  facilitate  the  mobility  of  workers. 
However,  so  far  no  legislation  has  been  adopted  by  the 
parliament. 
20  New  estimates  of  income  replacement ratios for  statutory 
pension  schemes  in  the  Community  are  currently  being  worked 
out  by  EUROSTAT,  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  European 
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Contributions  to  supplementary  pension  schemes  are  tax 
deductible  as  long  as  they  do  not  result  in  too  high  a 
replacement  ratio.  Investment  income  of  pension  funds  is 
subject to  a  withholding tax.  Income  tax  is  due  on  benefits 
above  a  certain minimum. 
DENMARK 
The  Danish statutory social security system provides  a  basic 
pension  for  all residents  from  the  age  of  67.  In  addition, 
persons  in  employment  are  covered  by  a  mandatory 
contributory  scheme  the  benefit  level  of  which  is  only 
determined  by  the  length  of  service  and  not  by  the  level  of 
earnings. 
Although  the  statutory  pension  schemes  leave  considerable 
scope  for  supplementary  schemes,  less  than  half  of  the 
employees  seem  to  be  covered  by  such  schemes.  Recently  an 
agreement  has  been reached  on the establishment of  industry-
wide pension schemes  which  should be  in place by  1993. 
Employees  do  normally pay part of the total contributions to 
their  pension  schemes  which  tend  to  be  of  the  'defined 
contribution'  type. 
Contributions  to  pension  schemes  are  normally  tax 
deductible,  provided  some  conditions  are  met.  Benefits  are 
subject  to  income  tax.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
pension  funds  are  s~bject  to  a  tax  on  the  real  return  on 
their capital. 
GERMANY 
Statutory social security provides  earnings related pensions 
up  to  a  fairly  high  income  ceiling,  leaving  some  scope  for 
supplementary  schemes  especially  in  the  case  of  well-paid 
workers. 
Supplementary  schemes  are  usually  set  up  by  employers  for 
the  benefit of their employees  contributions  of  whom  to the 
schemes  are  uncommon  and  in most  cases  even  impossible  (book 
reserve schemes) . 
The  dominant  type  of  financing  technique  are  book  reserves, 
although pension  funds  and direct life assurance also exist. 
The  solvency  of  any  not  fully  funded  pension  scheme  has  to 
be  guarantee  by  a  membership  in  the  solvency  insurance 
~  scheme  'Pensionssicherungsverein'. 
Legislation  on  supplementary  pension  schemes  exists  since 
1974  when  a  law  for  the  improvement  of  occupational 
retirement  provision  was  adcpted,  codifying  recent  rulings 
of  the  labour  courts.  The  law  introduced  in  particular 
(comparatively  high)  limits  on  vesting  periods  and  an Commun-ication  on  supplementary pensions,  appendix 
o:Oligation  to  adj.us.t. pensions  , in  line  with· inflation  or 
earnings. 
Taxation  depends  on  the  financing  vehicle  chosen  for  a  · 
pension  scheme.  The tax burden falls on  contributions,  which 
are taxed as earned  income at the hands  of  employees;  in the 
case  of  insurance-type ·financing  techniques  and  o~ benefits 
in  the  case  of  book  reserve  schemes  and  the · so-called 
1 Untersttitzungskassen  1  which  do  not  create  a  legal 
entitlement  to  a  pension.  Investment  income  of  the  schemes 
is  normally  not  taxed.  Employee  contributions,  which  are 
only  possible  in  the  insurance-type  schemes,  are  tax 
deductible up  to certain limits. 
GREECE 
Statutory  pension  schemes  provide  benefits  calculated 
according  to  earnings  and  the  length  of  contribution 
periods.  For  average  workers  with  full  careers  the  benefit 
level  would  not  leave  very  much  scope  for  supplementary 
schemes.  It  should,  however,  be  pointed  out  that  social 
security  institutes  are  facing  serious  financial 
difficulties  which  may  require  a  general  overhaul  of  the 
system. 
Supplementary  benefits  are  provided  by  auxi:iary  funds 
usually set up  for  an  industry  or  a  profession.  The  largest 
of  these  schemes,  TEAM,  was  created  by  the  government  and 
covers  all  employees  affiliated  with  the  largest  social 
security  institute,  IKA,  who  are  not  members  of  another 
auxiliary fund. 
Some  multinational  employers  offer  pension  plans  of  a 
defined  benefit  type  which  are  normally  fully  integrated 
with  the  compulsory  schemes.  Such  voluntary private  schemes 
appear  to  be  largely unregulated  by  law  and,  in particular, 
no  legal  vesting  requirements  are  imposed.  Vesting  of  even 
of  employer  contributions  is  nevertheless  becoming  more 
common. 
Contributions  to  supplementary  pension  schemes  are  normally 
tax-deductible,  whilst benefits are taxed as earned  income. 
SPAIN 
Statutory  retirement  benefits  are  earnings  related  and  can 
be  considered  as  generous  as  they  tend  to  provide  a  high 
level of  replacement  income.  over the recent years,  measures 
were  adopted  which  tended  to  reduce  the  generosity  of  the 
system,  namely  by  taking  into  account  longer  earnings 
records  than  was  originally  the  case.  The  need  for 
supplementary protection nevertheless remains  limited. 
Many  large employers  do  have  supplementary  schemes which are 
often  taken  into  account  in  collective  agreements.  Until Communi~at1on orrsupplementary pensions,  appendix  A4 
1987  there was  little government  regulation of  supplementary 
schemes  and  even  the  1987  law  on  pension  plans  and  pension 
funds  does  not  oblige  pension  schemes  to  conform  to  this 
legislation.  Schemes  set up  under  the  1987  law  do,  however, 
benefit from  a  more  favourable  tax status. 
Up  until  now,  it appears  that  fewer  pension  schemes  than 
expected  have  applied  for  recognition  under  the  1987  law. 
This  may  be  explained  either  by  the  stringency  of  the 
conditions,  which  include  immediate  vesting,  full  external 
funding,  non-discriminatory  coverage  of all  employees  and  a 
high degree of workers'  participation.  On  the other hand,  it 
might  also  be  argued that tax  incentives  are  not  sufficient 
to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  freedom  implied  by  the  1987 
law. 
Employer  contributions  are  tax-deductible  but  they  would  be 
added  to the  taxable  income  of  the  employee  in  the  case  of 
schemes  which  do  not  comply  with  the  1987  law  and  in  the 
case  of  contributions  to  recognised  schemes  in  excess  of  a 
fixed  amount.  Benefits are taxable. 
FRANCE 
The  statutory  pension  scheme  provides  earnings  related 
benefits  of  up  to  50%  of  average  earnings  during  the  ten 
years  preceding  age  60  or  retirement.  However,  the  ceiling 
of  covered  earnings  can  be  considered  as  moderate.  Thus 
there is significant scope  for  supplementary schemes. 
Such  schemes  were  created  at  the  initiative  of  the  social 
partners  and  then  made  mandatory  for  all  employers  by  the 
government.  Whilst  there  are  many  institutions  managing 
supplementary  pension  schemes,  they  are  organised  in  two 
large associations,  AGIRC  (for higher-ranking employees}  and 
ARCCO  (mainly  for  blue-collar  workers).  Within  these 
associations,  the  conditions  for  the  acquisition  of  benefit 
entitlements  (contribution rates  and eligibility conditions) 
are  identical  and  financial  compensation  between 
institutions  is  organised  accordingly.  The  mandatory  nature 
of  these  supplementary  schemes  and  the  fact  that they  cover 
virtually all  employees  allow  them  to  be  safely  financed  on 
a  pay-as-you-go basis. 
Vesting  is  immediate  and  benefits  are  paid  anywhere  in  the 
Community.  Furthermore,  although  transfers  are  not  normally 
done 1  preserved  rights  are  well  protected  against  inflation 
as  members  acquire  'points•  the  value  of  which  is  the  same 
regardless  of  whether  they  were  acquired  3 0  years  ago  or 
only  last  year.  As  a  result,  mobile  workers  are  not  in 
danger of  losing pension rights. 
In  those  cases  in  which  normal  benefits  from  the  statutory 
and  mandatory  supplementary  :;chemes  are  not  considered  as 
sufficient,  additional  voluntary  contributions  can  be  made 
to  the  AGIRC  and  ARCCO  institutions.  Alternatively, Communication  on  supplementary pensions.1  appendix 
r.eti:: ::me:nt  ·bene>f its  CU.!!  be.  topped  Up  by  insurance  c~mtrarts  a 
ContTibutions  to  AGIRC  anc  ARC~O are  tax deductible  up  to  ~ 
high ceiling.  Benefits are taxed as  earned  income. 
IRELAND 
The  statutory  social  security  scheme  offers  benefits  which 
are related to contribution periods  but  not  to earnings.  As 
a  result,  the  majority  of  the  workforce  would  require 
additional  coverage.  About  50%  percent  of  employees  are 
covered by  supplementary  schemes. 
Supplementary  schemes  are  typically  set  up  and  run  by 
individual  employers  although  they  may  be  one  of  the  issues 
negotiated  with  trade  unions.  It  appears  that  employee 
contributions,  although  still  uncommon,  are  becoming  more 
frequent. 
In  1990,  a  comprehensive  new  legislation  on  occupational 
pensions  was  adopted.  The  pensions  act  provides  for  vesting 
after  a  maximum  of  fi :e  years,  offers  a  choice  between 
transfers  and  benefit  preservation  to  scheme  leavers  (in 
which  case  annual  revaluations  will  have  to  be  made)  and 
gives  scheme  members  the  right  to  detailed  information  on 
their  scheme  and  on  their  benefit  entitlements.  A  pensions 
board was  also created as  a  supervisory body. 
Contributions,  both  by  the  employer  and  by  the  employee,  to 
an  approved  scheme  are  tax  deductible,  as  long  as  they  do 
not  exceed  a  given  percentage  of  gross  earnings.  Benefits 
are subject to  income  tax. 
ITALY 
Stat~tory  social  security  provides  pensions  related  to 
earn1ngs  during  the  final  five  years  of  activity,  not 
limited by  an  earnings ceiling.  However,  lower  accrual rates 
apply  to  higher  income  levels,  so  that  high  earnings  are 
less well  covered than  low  earnings.  Nevertheless,  the  scope 
for  supplementary  retirement  provision  remains  extremely 
limited.  This  is  also  true  because  executives  in  industry 
and  commerce  are not  covered by the general statutory scheme 
but  by  special  'dirigenti'  schemes  which  are  based  on 
collective agreements. 
As  a  result,  supplementary  retirement provision  as  in  other 
Member  states  of  the  Community  is  rare  in  Italy.  Such 
arrangements  as  do  exist  can  be  set  up  in  a  variety  of 
different  forms,  as  far  as  the  type  of  benefits  and  the 
financing  and  management  methods  are  concerned.  A 
comprehensive  legal  framework  is  felt  to  be  necessary  and 
discussions are under way. 
Contributions  to  compulsory  pension  schemes  are  tax Communication  on  supplementary pensions,  appendix  A6 
deductible.  Employer  contributions  to  other  schemes  can  be 
considered  as  tax  deductible  expenses  if certain  conditions 
are  met,  namely  that  there  must  be  a  collective  agreement 
and  that it must  be  tun  by  a  clearly defined  separate  legal 
entity  ('cassa  di  Previdenza').  If  a  'Cassa  di  Previdenza' 
is  not  used,  contributions  will  be  considered  as  taxable 
income  of  the employee.  Benefits are subject to  income tax. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Statutory  social  security  provides  earnings  related 
retirement  benefits  subject  to  an  earnings  ceiling.  Higher-
paid employees will therefore require supplementary benefits 
in  order  to  maintain  there  standard  of  living  during 
retirement. 
Many  companies therefore have  supplementary pension schemes, 
usually  based  on  the  book  reserves  financing  method. 
Employee  contributions  are  not  common.  There  is  no 
obligation to take out  insurance against  insolvency.  Benefit 
promises  are  usually  closely  linked  to  statutory  benefits. 
There  is  no  legal  vesting  requirement  although  for  tax 
reasons  rights  often  become  vested  after  five  years  of 
scheme  membership. 
Whilst  employer  contributions  to  occupational  schemes  are 
treated as tax deductible expenses,  such contributions would 
be  considered  as  taxable  income  of  the  employee  if  the 
scheme  is  pre-funded.  Additions  to  book  reserves,  by 
contrast,  are  not  included  in  the  taxable  income  of  the 
employee.  Benefits are subject to  income  tax. 
NETHERLANDS 
statutory  retirement  benefits  are  flat  rate;  amounting  to 
50%  of  the  minimum  wage  for  singles  and  70%  for  couples.  As 
a  result,  supplementary  schemes  are  common  and  cover  most 
employees. 
Industry-wide  schemes  play  an  important  role  in  the  Dutch 
system.  Such  schemes  can  be  created  on  the  basis  of  a 
collective  agreement  and  membership  can  then  be  made 
mandatory  for  all  employees  of  a  the  sector,  even  if their 
employer  does  not  belong  to  the  employers'  confederation. 
Employees  do  normally  contribute  to  their  employer's  or 
industry's  pension  scheme  which  has  to  hold  separate  funds 
to guarantee that pension liabilities will be met; 
Rights  are  fully  vested  after  one  year's  scheme  membership. 
Over  recent  years  a  very  close  cooperation  amongst  many 
pension  funds  has  emerged  with  regard  to  transfers  of 
pension  rights.  As  a  result  of  this  voluntary  arrangement, 
pension  losses for  job changers  have  been minimised. 
Reasonable  contributions  to  pension  funds  providing -
co:mmunication on .-suppJ.e:n·~ntary- pensions,  'appendix  A7. 
annuities  rather·  than  .lump.  sums  are  tax  deductible  ·and 
employer  contributions  are  not  considered  as  taxable  income 
of  the.  employee.  Benefits  are  taxed  on  the  basis  of  a 
special tax schedule .for pensions. 
PORTUGAL 
Statutory  pensions  are .related  to  the  earnings. during· the 
best five years within  a  ten year period prior to retirement 
and  benefits  are .confined  to  a  range  of  30  to  80%  (for  a 
full  career}  of the average  earnings of these five years. 
Occupational  pension  schemes  are  not  ve~y·common,  possibly 
as  a  result of the small average  co~pany size.  However,  some 
schemes  had  been  created  on  the  basis  of  collective 
agreements  following  the  1974  revolution.  Many  schemes  are 
financed  on  a  pay-as-you-go  or  book  reserve  basis  although 
recent legislation gives tax advantages to funded  schemes. 
There  is  no  legal  vesting 
unusual.  Some  schemes  offer 
voluntary retirement. 
requirement  and  vesting 
incentives  to  employees 
is 
for 
Contributions  to  supplementary  pension  schemes  are  normally 
tax-deductible  for  employers  and  employees.  Allocations  to 
book  reserves  are  not  considered  as  tax-deductible  expenses 
but  benefits  are.  Benefits  are  subject  to  special,  more 
favourable  income tax rules. 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Statutory  social  security  provides  for  a  flat  rate  pension 
and  an  earnings  related  additional  pension  (SERFS) •  The 
combination  of  these  two  elements  does  nevertheless  not 
normally  yield  a  satisfactory  replacement  income. 
Supplementary  schemes  are  therefore  common.  It  is  possible 
to  contract  out  of  SERFS  provided  the  private  (company  or 
personal)  scheme offers equivalent guarantees. 
About  50%  of  the  employees  are  covered  by  supplementary 
schemes  which  are  typically  set  up  by  companies  and  are 
normally pre-funded,  either through an  insurance contract or 
a  separate pension  fund.  Employee  contributions are common. 
Pension rights must vest after two years.  Recent  legislation 
has  improved  the  situation  of  scheme  leavers  by  making  a 
limited revaluation of deferred pensions  compulsory. 
Provided  a  scheme  is  approved  by  tax  authorities, 
contributions  to  it  are  tax  deductible  and  are  not 
considered  as  taxable  income  of  the  employee.  Investment 
income  of  funds  is  tax  exempt.  Benefits  are  subject  to 
income  tax. 